Title 1. Property Tax Code
Subtitle F. Remedies
Chapter 42. Judicial Review
Subchapter A. In General
Sec. 42.01. Right of Appeal by Property Owner.
Notes:
The Tax Injunction Act bars injunctive or declaratory relief for state tax matters in federal court unless the state fails to have a speedy and efficient remedy for a taxpayer's claim. Texas courts have such a remedy, and taxpayers could not seek injunctive remedy for taxes assessed on their homesteads for improperly granted exemptions to previous owners of the homes. Hamilton v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, No. 3:98-CV-2553-L (N. D. Tex. 1999).
Taxpayer sued in state court arguing federal law "civil rights" violations relating to tax assessments. The Oklahoma State Court refused any relief under the Federal Civil Rights Act because adequate rights to contest the tax assessment existed under state law. Those legal rights had to be exercised by the taxpayer. National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 115 U.S. 2351, 132 L. Ed 2d 509 (1995).
Coastal was required to register as a foreign limited partnership to appeal appraisal of salt dome storage caverns. Had it at the time of registration paid both the registration fee and the statutorily-mandated additional fees for the years it had transacted business in Texas before registering, then Coastal would have been properly registered and able to maintain the appeals. Coastal Liquids Transportation v. Harris County Appraisal District, 46 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001).
Since taxpayers must exhaust their administrative remedies in their property valuation protests under the Tax Code in each year before they are allowed to pursue court remedies, each appeal to the court represents a separate action. Therefore, Sec. 42.29 authorizes award of attorney's fees for each tax year at issue in a multi-year property tax case. Atascosa County Appraisal District v. Tymrak, 858 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1993).
Tourneau Houston, Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary of Tourneau, Inc.) had no standing to appeal because it was not the owner, was never designated in writing to be the owner's agent, and no such designation was ever filed with the appraisal district. Tourneau Houston, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 24 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, rehearing denied, opinion substituted).
While suit was pending on the company's personal property valuation, the company filed bankruptcy under Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Code. The trial court did not violate the automatic stay provision under Bankruptcy Code when it dismissed the suit for want of prosecution. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Denton County Appraisal District and Denton County Appraisal Review Board, 13 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 2000).
The filing of an unsworn statement with the ARB in lieu of a personal appearance or sworn statement is insufficient to exhaust one's administrative remedies and preserve the right of judicial review. J. C. Evans Constr. Co. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 4 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App. -- Austin 1999, no pet.)
To determine an unequal appraisal protest in favor of the property owner provided by Tax Code Section 41.43, the appraisal review board's appraised value should be used since that is the only appraised value in existence when a protest is brought before district court. No conflict exists with Section 42.23 because the appraised value is simply the most current one on the tax rolls and admitted into evidence whether or not it was revised by the appraisal review board. Harris County Appraisal District and Harris County Appraisal Review Board v. Michael Duncan, 944 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th District] 1997, writ denied).
A property owner who did not protest situs to the ARB, but who did appeal to the district court's tax master, has not exhausted his administrative remedies and is not entitled to a trial de novo in district court. Sierra Stage Coaches, Inc. v. La Porte Independent School District, 832 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
Taxpayer whose property is being taxed in two counties must exhaust his administrative and legal remedies in each county. Due process rights are not violated by the fact that there is no single forum in which situs issues may be resolved. Taxpayer does not waive constitutional issues where he first exhausts administrative remedies. General Electric Credit Corp. v. Midland Central Appraisal District, 808 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991).
Taxing unit may not bring suit to collect delinquent taxes while a Chapter 42 action concerning the property is pending. Valero Transmission Company v. San Marcos Independent School District, 770 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
Where taxpayer was dissatisfied with his property appraisal his exclusive remedies under the Property Tax Code are that of administrative and judicial review within available grounds of protest. When a taxpayer's protest to tax has been determined by the review board, he may then file suit for judicial review of the board's decision, but the board's decision is not a prerequisite to a suit by a taxing unit for delinquent taxes. Valero Transmission Company v. Hays Consolidated Independent School District, 704 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Sec. 42.02. Right of Appeal by Chief Appraiser.
Notes:
Failure of prior property owners to assert lack of notice precludes subsequent owners from challenging the validity of past appraisals. Failure to deliver timely notices nullifies changes in appraisal rolls only with regard to the property owner at the time. Although the Tax Code authorizes notices of appeal by a "party other than a property owner," the parties contemplated are the chief appraiser and other governmental entities. The tax payment requirement of Section 42.08 was upheld as a requirement to maintain an appeal. Houston Land & Cattle Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 104 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
Sec. 42.06. Notice of Appeal.
Notes:
The 45-day limitation period for appeal of an appraisal review board decision only begins to run when proper notice is delivered to the appropriate party. Section 1.07(b) requires the tax official or agency to address the notice to the property owner, the person designated under Section 1.111(f) to receive the notice for the property owner (if that section applies) or, if appropriate, the property owner's agent at his address according to the most recent record in the possession of the official or agency. If a property owner files a written request for notices to be sent to a particular address, the official or agency shall send the notice to the address stated in the request. The erroneous delivery of a notice and order does not serve to trigger the 45-day period for appeal. A specific statutory scheme sets forth the manner in which property tax representatives may be designated and the effect that designation has on a taxing authority's obligation to deliver notice. The Texas Administrative Code provides that when an agent is an employee of a subsidiary of the owner, the owner is not required to provide documents supporting that agent's authority. The agent designation form itself states only that the person naming a tax agent should attach documentation - a suggestion that is not mandatory. Harris County Appraisal District and Harris County Appraisal Review Board v. Drever Partners, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th District] 1997).
Property owner admitted the receipt of both notice of issuance of order of the appraisal review board determination and a copy of the order signed by current appraisal review board chairman. Sending the notice of appeal to former chairman of review board was insufficient to perfect appeal for judicial review. R. J. Underhill v. Jefferson County Appraisal District, 725 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
Taxpayers who failed to comply with the Tax Code provisions for protesting property valuation were preempted from a right to judicial review because of the exclusiveness of the remedies provided by the Tax Code. Adams v. Kendall County Appraisal District, 724 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
Sections 42.06, 42.09, and 42.21 are presumed constitutional, and appellant was bound by them. Sections 42.01-42.29, which govern administrative and judicial review of assessments made by taxing authorities, supersede common law principles whereby equitable relief could be obtained in a lawsuit. The appellant's contention in this case was not considered an attack on the constitutionality of code provisions because the appellant had affirmatively availed himself of the administrative review proceedings to challenge the assessment. Texas Architectural Aggregate, Inc. v. Adams, 690 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
Sec. 42.08. Forfeiture of Remedy for Nonpayment of Taxes.
Notes:
Failure of prior property owners to assert lack of notice precludes subsequent owners from challenging the validity of past appraisals. Failure to deliver timely notices nullifies changes in appraisal rolls only with regard to the property owner at the time. Although the Tax Code authorizes notices of appeal by a "party other than a property owner," the parties contemplated are the chief appraiser and other governmental entities. The tax payment requirement of Section 42.08 was upheld as a requirement to maintain an appeal. Houston Land & Cattle Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 104 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
When the appraisal district failed to send notices of appraised value to a taxpayer for a number of years after the recording of deeds on purchased property, that failure of notice constituted a denial of due process, thus making the assessment of penalties and interest void. The fact that the taxpayer later paid the void taxes did not cause them to be unrecoverable. The voluntary payment rule cannot be applied to taxes imposed without due process. The award of attorney fees to the taxpayer was upheld as within the guidelines concerning declaratory judgments and was supported by evidence. Appraisal Review Board of the El Paso Central Appraisal District v. Fisher, 88 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied).
Although facts may establish that taxes have not been paid timely, a party's conduct, including notification of an inability to pay taxes and entering an installment agreement to pay, is strong evidence of substantial compliance with the statutory requirement that undisputed taxes be paid prior to delinquency. Titanium Metals Corp. v. Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 3 S.W.3d 63 (Tex App.-- Dallas 1999, no pet.)
Partial tender of assessed taxes prior to the delinquency date was sufficient to prevent the imposition of penalty and interest on the unpaid balance as well as to avoid any effort to collect the balance due pending the resolution of the property valuation lawsuit. House Bill 2201 (1997) deleted the unconstitutional portion of Section 42.08(b) and amended Section 42.42 for the due date of a post-appeal supplemental tax bill and the penalty and interest on such bill. By changing the delinquency date for pending valuation cases not yet reduced to judgment, the Legislature did no more than remit a penalty and did not release an indebtedness or liability owed to a political subdivision of the State. Further, this change is not an unconstitutional release of an indebtedness under Article III, Section 55, Texas Constitution. Jefferson County, et. al v. Clark Refining & Marketing, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 1999).
A taxpayer may not protest her property valuation simply because she did not own the property at the time of assessment. Since the Tax Code provides for exclusive remedies for protest, the taxpayer may not later seek to present evidence of property value in 1987 and 1988 when the owner of the property at the time did not choose to protest property valuation. Thus, the district court was correct in excluding evidence of property valuation in 1987 and 1988. Hood v. Hays County, 836 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
Full payment of taxes made before 1989 amendment does not deprive taxpayer of right to proceed to final determination of his appeal. Section 42.08 changes were retroactive. Dallas CAD v. Seven Investment Company and Dallas CAD v. Las Colinas Corporation, 813 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991), rev'd on other grounds 835 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. 1992).
The unit valuation approach is constitutional. Payment of taxes under stipulation does not constitute voluntary payment. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Dickinson Independent School District, 794 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
Taxpayer does not lose his right to a final determination of his appeal by making a full payment of taxes owed. Harston v. Kendall County Appraisal District, 773 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
Sec. 42.09. Remedies Exclusive.
Notes:
Several local taxing units filed suit directly against owners of oil producing properties alleging that through fraud and conspiracy the owners had reduced the valuation of their property for purposes of property taxation by misrepresenting the market value of various oil transactions. In a plea to the jurisdiction, the Amarillo Court of Appeals found the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter since the Tax Code provides an adequate and exclusive remedy that was not followed. Specifically, the taxing units had failed to submit a challenge to the appraisal roll or file suit against the appraisal district, which thereby deprived the district court of jurisdiction regarding the matter. In re ExxonMobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 2004, no pet.).
The property owner was required to register as a foreign limited partnership to appeal the appraisal of salt dome storage caverns. Had it at the time of registration paid both the registration fee and the statutorily-mandated additional fees for the years it had transacted business in Texas before registering, then the property owner would have been properly registered and able to maintain the appeals. Coastal Liquids Transportation v. Harris County Appraisal District, 46 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2001).
Since taxpayers must exhaust their administrative remedies in their property valuation protests under the Tax Code in each year before they are allowed to pursue court remedies, each appeal to the court represents a separate action. Therefore, Sec. 42.29 authorizes award of attorney's fees for each tax year at issue in a multi-year property tax case. Atascosa County Appraisal District v. Tymrak, 858 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1993).
Where taxpayer claimed not to be the owner of property upon which delinquent taxes were due and he had not presented this fact before the appraisal review board, he has waived non-ownership as a defense to a delinquent tax suit. A taxpayer must protest the non-ownership issue before the appraisal review board. Anderson v. Robstown Independent School District, 706 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1986). (Note: 1987 amendment adds Sec. 42.09(b) that provides defenses to delinquent tax lawsuit where property owner did not own personal property on January 1 or where real property was outside taxing unit's boundaries on January 1.)
Where an appraisal district may have misled a property owner regarding the administrative remedies available to pursue, such conduct does not confer jurisdiction on a trial court if the administrative remedies were not exhausted by the property owner. Interstate Apt. Enterprises, L.C. v. Wichita Appraisal Dist., 164 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
When the appraisal district failed to send notices of appraised value to a taxpayer for a number of years after the recording of deeds on purchased property, that failure of notice constituted a denial of due process, thus making the assessment of penalties and interest void. The fact that the taxpayer later paid the void taxes did not cause them to be unrecoverable. The voluntary payment rule cannot be applied to taxes imposed without due process. The award of attorney fees to the taxpayer was upheld as within the guidelines concerning declaratory judgments and was supported by evidence. Appraisal Review Board of the El Paso Central Appraisal District v. Fisher, 88 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied).
A leasehold's valuation was not the annual contract rental price on each leased lot, but instead had to be based on the leasehold's current market value which might be higher than the contract price given the demand for leasehold estates. All comparables of fee-simple interests should be eliminated from data used in establishing the fair market value of leaseholds, but the appraisals should not be limited to the amount of annual rent being paid on the leaseholds. Panola County Fresh Water Supply District Number One v. Panola County Appraisal District and Panola County Appraisal Review Board, 69 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2002).
A property owner who did not protest situs to the ARB, but who did appeal to the district court's tax master, has not exhausted his administrative remedies and is not entitled to a trial de novo in district court. Sierra Stage Coaches, Inc. v. La Porte Independent School District, 832 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
A taxpayer who fails to exhaust his statutory remedies is not entitled to mandamus relief. Watson v. Robertson County Appraisal Review Board, 795 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990, no writ).
Taxpayers who failed to comply with the Tax Code provisions for protesting property valuation were preempted from a right to judicial review because of the exclusiveness of the remedies provided by the Tax Code. Adams v. Kendall County Appraisal District, 724 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
Injunctive relief by a taxpayer for protesting valuation of his property is no longer permissible; the legislature has provided a comprehensive plan for appeal of taxing authorities' decisions in the Tax Code and has required property owners to follow that plan. Brazoria County Appraisal District v. Notlef, Inc., 721 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Taxpayer failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to comply with the Property Tax Code's administrative review process, and was precluded from asserting a common law cause of action for grossly excessive valuation because the code's procedures are the only means by which to challenge the property's valuation by an appraisal district. Dallas County Appraisal District v. Lal, 701 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The failure of the appraisal district to deliver a notice of appraised value denied due process to the taxpayer and deprived the appraisal review board of jurisdiction to consider any increase in taxpayer's valuation above the amount rendered. Because the board did not acquire jurisdiction over the valuation, the taxpayer was not confined to remedies under the Property Tax Code and could challenge the assessments through a collateral attack. Garza v. Block Distributing Co., 696 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Failure of appraisal district to act on a taxpayer's application for an exemption as a charitable organization was not a denial of the request. The application was merely held in abeyance pending the outcome of other proceedings. The chief appraiser could have determined the taxpayer's status, but did not; therefore, there was no requirement the taxpayer pursue administrative remedies before raising the defense of a tax exemption for that year. Moody House, Inc. v. Galveston County, 687 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-Houston 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Subchapter B. Review by District Court
Sec. 42.21. Petition for Review.
Notes:
Taxing units' claims in bankruptcy are based on a property's total value at the time of bankruptcy, not the property's net value after any existing liens against the property. In Re: Milit, Inc., 231 B.R. 604 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
The appraisal district is not a necessary party in bankruptcy court. Protests filed against an appraisal district are a procedural requirement that is not binding on federal court. A written settlement agreement between an appraisal district and taxpayer bars subsequent challenges in bankruptcy court, but failure to appear before the review board hearing does not bar challenge in bankruptcy court. In Re: Blue Cactus Post, L.C., 229 B.R. 379 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
Taxpayer could not have property values changed in bankruptcy court when the taxpayer had reached agreements on the values with the appraisal district. In Re: Crest-Mex. Corp., 223 B.R. 681 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
A property owner is required to register with the Secretary of State as doing business in this state before it can have the necessary capacity to sue and challenge a property tax appraisal it believed is erroneous.Coastal Liquids Transportation, L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880 (Tex 2001)
Taxpayer failed to apply for an open-space land designation upon a request by the chief appraiser and protested under Section 25.25 as a clerical error concerning the date of conveyance of property. The appraisal review board held for the appraisal district. The order determining protest was not delivered to the taxpayer for more than four months due to an address change. The trial court held that the property qualified for an open-space land designation without the need for re-application. The Court upheld the ruling. Because administrative remedies were exhausted and the taxpayer filed suit within 45 days of receiving the order, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to decide the controlling issue in the case. Cooke County Tax Appraisal District v. Teel, No. 2-03-115-CV (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 2003, no pet. h.).
The taxpayer must follow statutory procedures for allocation of value to apply. The owner waived constitutional entitlement to interstate allocation by failing to protest before the appraisal review board. The aircraft was located in the district on January 1 of each year in question, and the taxpayer did not challenge the description of the property on the appraisal rolls. The aircraft value therefore could not be allocated for prior years. A & S Air Service, Inc. v. Denton Central Appraisal District, 99 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2003, no pet.).
Sanctions against a taxing unit are inappropriate because the taxpayer may not raise excessive appraisal or nonownership in district court without first exhausting the administrative remedies in the Tax Code. Taxpayer did not protest the property's appraisal or ownership to the appraisal review board, and thus could not raise those issues in a delinquent tax lawsuit. Aldine Independent School District v. Baty, 999 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th District] 1999).
A motion requesting a ruling on substantial compliance under Section 42.08 was not required to be filed before the delinquency date for payment of the taxes. Jackson Hotel Corporation v. Wichita County Appraisal District, 980 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-- Fort Worth [2nd District] 1998).
Court had no jurisdiction to hear case of taxpayer who filed petition 135 days after receiving the appraisal review board order. Hurst v. Guadalupe County Appraisal District, 752 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
Organization did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Tax Code when it filed the written notice of intent to appeal within the 15-day period with the appraisal district and not with the appraisal review board. In filing for judicial review within the 45-day period, the property owner must name and serve both groups. Program Centers of Grace Union Presbytery, Inc. v. Earle, 726 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
Taxpayers who failed to comply with the Tax Code provisions for protesting property valuation were preempted from a right to judicial review because of the exclusiveness of the remedies provided by the Tax Code. Adams v. Kendall County Appraisal District, 724 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
Taxpayer protesting an appraisal review board determination was barred from judicial review for failure to file notice within 45 days from receipt of the review board's determination, the "final order" required by Section 41.47 of the Tax Code. Flores v. Fort Bend Central Appraisal District, 720 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Houston 1986, no writ).
Sections 42.06, 42.09, and 42.21 are presumed constitutional, and appellant was bound by them. Sections 42.01-42.29 which govern administrative and judicial review of assessments made by taxing authorities supersede common law principles whereby equitable relief was obtainable in a lawsuit. The appellant's contention in this case was not considered an attack on the constitutionality of code provisions because the appellant had affirmatively availed himself of the administrative review proceedings to challenge the assessment. Texas Architectural Aggregate, Inc. v. Adams, 690 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
Sec. 42.23. Scope of Review.
Notes:
An appraisal review board failed to give a taxpayer notice of a value increase resulting from a taxing unit challenge. Proper notice of an increased appraised value is a jurisdictional requirement that may be considered for the first time on appeal. The value increase was set aside due to the failure of notice to the taxpayer. However, the taxpayer's assertion that it should have been notified of the taxing unit challenge hearing was rejected. Lamar County Appraisal District v. Campbell Soup Co., 93 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
A party does not necessarily exhaust its administrative remedies if it fails to raise a particular argument before the appraisal review board. Argument can be presented and considered during an appeal of the ARB order that were not presented at the administrative hearing It is sufficient for jurisdictional purposes if values are alleged to be excessive. Zapata County Appraisal District v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 90 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
To determine an unequal appraisal protest in favor of the property owner provided by Tax Code Section 41.43, the appraisal review board's appraised value should be used since that is the only appraised value in existence when a protest is brought before district court. No conflict exists with Section 42.23 because the appraised value is simply the most current one on the tax rolls and admitted into evidence whether or not it was revised by the appraisal review board. Harris County Appraisal District and Harris County Appraisal Review Board v. Michael Duncan, 944 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th District] 1997, writ denied).
Sec. 42.24. Action by Court.
Notes:
There is no enforceable contract if an appellant did not unconditionally accept the original proposal of the tax district to settle a lawsuit, and the tax district rejected the counter-offer of appellant. Antonini v. Harris County Appraisal District, 999 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th District] 1999).
Sec. 42.26. Remedy for Unequal Appraisal.
Note:
In the claim of unequal appraisal, the owner's agent applied no statistical formula in his calculation of the appropriate number of sample population size for the median level appraisal determination as required by the Tax Code. Evidence was sufficient to support the tax appraiser's assessment of the strip shopping center. Sagemont Plaza Shopping v. Harris County Appraisal District, 30 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 2000, petition denied).
Sec. 42.28. Appeal of District Court Judgment.
Notes:
A nursing home met the constitutional and statutory charitable exemption requirements by providing medical care without regard to ability to pay even though substantially more patients paid than those who did not. Because it restricted its assets to charitable functions and offered services to persons who would otherwise become burdens of the state, it qualified regardless of the religious motivations of its operators or its effect on a limited group. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 84 providing penalty for frivolous appeals does apply to a government agency. Dallas County Appraisal District v. the Leaves, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
Sec. 42.29. Attorney's Fees.
Notes:
Property owner filed protests for two tax years and then entered into a written settlement agreement with the appraisal district, therefore it could not qualify for a change of value under Section 25.25(d), Allocation of value cannot properly be corrected using Section 25.25(c) and the grant of attorney fees is not required for an issue of allocation of value. Aramco Associated Company v. Harris County Appraisal District and Harris County Appraisal Review Board, 33 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2000).
There was no duty on the part of the attorney for taxpayers to disclose in response to an interrogatory, the subject matter to which he, as an expert witness, would testify at trial. Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to testify regarding attorney's fees. Yarborough v. Tarrant Appraisal District, 846 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
When taxpayer pays in full prior to trial all taxes, penalties and interest owed to the appellees, as a matter of law taxing units were not entitled to recover any attorney's fees from the taxpayer. Gano v. City of Houston, 834 S. W. 2d 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
Subchapter C. Postappeal Administrative Procedures
Sec. 42.42. Corrected and Supplemental Tax Bills.
Note:
Partial tender of assessed taxes prior to the delinquency date was sufficient to prevent the imposition of penalty and interest on the unpaid balance and to avoid any effort to collect the balance due pending the resolution of the property valuation lawsuit. House Bill 2201 (1997) deleted the unconstitutional portion of Section 42.08(b) and amended Section 42.42 for the due date of a post-appeal supplemental tax bill and the penalty and interest on such bill. Furthermore, by changing the delinquency date for pending valuation cases not yet reduced to judgment the Legislature did no more than remit a penalty and did not release an indebtedness or liability owed to a political subdivision of the State. HB 2201 is not an unconstitutional release of an indebtedness under Article III, Section 55, Texas Constitution. Jefferson County, et. al v. Clark Refining & Marketing, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 1999).